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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
LEGAL ETHICs-Canon 19-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
suggested by way of dicta that it can be unethical for an attorney to act as
trial counsel in a case wherein his partner will appear as a material wit-
ness.
Weiherer v. Werley, 422 Pa. 18, 221 A.2d 133 (1966).
Appellant Weiherer brought a suit in equity requesting the rescission of
a deed conveying property to appellees (Norman G. Werley and Stella M.
Werley, his wife, and Norman G. Werley, individually) and other relief.
Appellant alleged that she lacked sufficient mental capacity to understand
the true meaning of her act at the time she signed the deed. On August 15,
1960, two days after appellant's husband had died, appellant executed a
power of attorney appointing appellee, Norman G. Werley, to manage her
affairs. At this time appellant also executed her will in which appellees
were to receive the major portions of the specific bequests. Attorney Carl
F. Mogel prepared both of these documents. He had been recommended
to appellant by the appellees. On August 27, 1960, the appellant signed
the disputed sales agreement. At the settlement on September 19, 1960,
Attorney Mogel explained the contents of the documents to the appellant
who then signed them. When this dispute later arose appellees retained
Attorney Mogel as their counsel. At the trial it developed that Attorney
Mogel would be called by the appellant to testify regarding the execution
of the various documents mentioned earlier.' At this point Attorney Mogel
withdrew as counsel for the appellees at the suggestion of the Chancellor
and was replaced by one of his partners.' Later in the proceedings
Attorney Mogel was called as a witness for the appellees, at which time
he testified to matters relating to the competency of the appellant.' This
testimony for the appellees went to one of the substantive issues of the
controversy, in contrast to Attorney Mogel's prior testimony for the
appellant relating to a mere formal matter concerning execution.
The trial court refused to rescind the deed in question or grant the other
relief sought by appellant. Appellant filed exceptions but these were dis-
missed by the Common Pleas Court en banc and this appeal followed.4
On appeal, appellant contended, inter alia, that "the Chancellor abused his
discretion and committed legal error when he allowed ... [Attorney]
Mogel ... to testify on behalf of appellees, and allowed his law partner
to replace him as counsel of record for appellees."' This contention was
1. Record, p. 42a, Weiherer v. Werley, 422 Pa. 18, 221 A.2d 133 (1966).
2. Id. at p. 43a.
3. Id. at p. 145a.
4. Pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 41 (1950).
5. 422 Pa. at 25, 221 A.2d at 136.
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based on Canon 6' and Canon 19 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
of the American Bar Association.7 Canon 19 reads as follows:
APPEARANCE OF LAWYER AS WITNESS FOR His CLIENT
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely
formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instru-
ment and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other
counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer
should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.'
In Weiherer v. Werley9 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in an unani-
mous opinion written by Justice O'Brien answered this contention (after
rejecting the other arguments of the appellant) by stating, "although the
Chancellor allowed Mr. Mogel's partner to act as trial counsel after
disclosure had been made, in view of the evidence to support the Chan-
cellor's findings, we believe that no prejudice resulted to appellant and,...
in this instance, reversible error did not occur."'" [Emphasis added.]
In arriving at this conclusion Justice O'Brien quoted the full text of
Canons 6 and 19 and then stated:
6. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMITnTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES 3 (1957
ed.). Canon 6 reads as follows:
ADVERSE INFLUENCES AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS.
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the
circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with
the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this
canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is
his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to
divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers
or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client
with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
7. PA. R.C.P. 205 (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 appendix) states in pertinent part, "The canons
of ethics of the American Bar Association, as from time to time existing, shall be and become
standards of conduct for attorneys of the court."
This rule gives the canons the same effect as if they had been enacted by statute. In re
Schofield, 362 Pa. 201, 66 A.2d 675 (1949).
8. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES 15
(1957 ed.). PA. R.C.P. 222 (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 appendix) provides:
Where any attorney acting as trial counsel in the trial of an action is called as
a witness in behalf of a party whom he represents, the court may determine whether
such attorney may thereafter continue to act as trial counsel during the remainder of
the trial.
Note: Rule 222 confers discretion upon the court as to whether trial counsel, taking
the stand as witness in behalf of a party whom he represents, may continue to act as
such trial counsel. The rules of a number of counties prohibit further participation
in the trial by any attorney who becomes a witness in behalf of his client.
9. 422 Pa. 18, 221 A.2d 133 (1966).
10. Id. at 27, 221 A.2d at 137.
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We must disagree with appellant's contention that the Chan-
cellor erred in allowing Mr. Mogel to testify, as the record
indicates that Mr. Mogel did little more than act as scrivener,
preparing the documents in question, and no evidence of any
confidential relationship existing between appellant and Mr.
Mogel is apparent, rather, it seems, that he was acting at that
time as an attorney for both parties, as both parties were al-
ways present. We believe that under the circumstances, it would
have constituted better professional taste if counsel other than
that of the firm of Mr. Mogel had represented the appellees,
but this alone will not justify a reversal in the instant case. See
Coulter Estate, 406 Pa. 402, 178 A.2d 742 (1962). As a full dis-
closure had been made to the Chancellor at all times, he must
certainly have given due consideration to this question."
[Emphasis added.]
The above dicta, disregarding the Canon 6 aspects,' 2 strongly suggests
that there can be instances wherein it will be reversible error for an
attorney to act as trial counsel in a case in which his partner will appear
as a material witness.
In law firms of all sizes counsel-witness situations occur with relative
frequency in various areas of practice. One common area is that of will
contests. The Weiherer dicta, if interpreted broadly, will force these firms
to substantially alter their present practice. Before requiring such a
change a careful examination of this area of legal ethics should be under-
taken. The Weiherer opinion does not provide such an analysis.
In Coulter Estate,3 relied on by Justice O'Brien in Weiherer, an
attorney, Grubb, had represented an elderly gentleman, Coulter, as both
attorney and attorney in fact for several years. In March, 1961, Coulter
cancelled Grubb's power of attorney. Shortly thereafter Coulter's sister
and first cousin retained Grubb's law firm to bring suit under the In-
competents' Estates Act of 1955'" to have Coulter declared incompetent
and a guardian of his estate appointed. Grubb was a material witness at
the Orphan's Court hearing while one of his partners acted at trial counsel.
11. Id. at 26, 221 A.2d at 137.
12. Appellant had argued violations of both Canon 6 and Canon 19. Justice O'Brien does
not refer to either Canon specifically in the above quote, supra note 11, and thus it is difficult
to determine the individual contribution of each Canon to Justice O'Brien's statement that
"it would have constituted better professional taste if counsel other than that of the firm of
Mr. Mogel had represented the appellees. . . ." This casenote is based on the premise that
Canon 19 contributed substantially to the statement and this casenote is limited to the
problems presented under Canon 19. For a discussion of partnership problems under Canon 6
see Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-flirm Con-
flicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058 (1964).
13. 406 Pa. 402, 178 A.2d 742 (1962).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 3101 et seq. (1955), as amended (1957).
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Coulter was found to be incompetent under the act and this finding was
affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. However the
supreme court commented that "under the . . . circumstances, with the
knowledge that Attorney Grubb would be called as a witness, it would
have constituted much better professional taste if counsel other than
his own firm had acted for petitioners. Such representation, however,
does not justify a vacation of the instant decree."' 5 Here again the su-
preme court did not divulge the reasons why such action constitutes poor
professional taste.
In 1941 the American Bar Association Committee on Professional
Ethics and Grievances issued an opinion (no. 220)16 on an ethics prob-
lem'7 substantially similar to that presented in Weiherer. In a previous
opinion'" this Committee had adopted the postion that "the relations of
partners in a law firm are so close that the firm, and all the members
thereof, are barred from accepting any employment, that any one member
of the firm is prohibited from taking."' 9 The Committee relied on this
statement in two subsequent opinions2" involving Canon 19, in deciding
that an attorney could not act as trial counsel where his partner was pro-
hibited.from acting as such because of his position as a material witness
in the case.
In Opinion No. 220 the Committee, by a vote of five to two, modified
these three previous decisions and stated that Canon 19 would not be
violated by an attorney testifying as a material witness in a case in which
15. 406 Pa. 402, 409, 178 A.2d 742, 746 (1962).
16. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COM7MITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES 437
(1957 ed.).
17. The problem presented was, as stated at 437 of ABA, OPINONS OF THE COMMITTEE
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCEs (1957 ed.):
A member of a law firm has represented a decedent in connection with a gift
subject to federal gift tax, having drawn all the papers, calculated and paid the tax,
and given an opinion to his client that the gift was proper and not made in con-
templation of death. The lawyer also represented the decedent in connection with the
drafting of his Will, and was expected by the decedent to represent his estate, which
the Executor and the family of the decedent also desired.
After the client's death, the attorney and his firm are retained to represent the
estate. Subsequently, claim is made by the Federal Government that the gift was
made in contemplation of death, and a tax is assessed. The attorney who represented
the decedent is a necessary witness to defend the gift.
Is it unethical for his partner to continue to represent the estate in opposing the
claim of the Federal Government?
18. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES 118
(1957 ed.), Opinion 33 (1931). This opinion was concerned with a problem involving
Canon 6.
19. Id. at 118.
20. Id. at 138 (Opinion 50, 1931), and at 368 (Opinion 185, 1938). Opinion 185 involved
a criminal case wherein one partner is a material witness for the prosecution while the other
partner is defense counsel.
1966-1967]
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
his partner would appear as trial counsel provided that: (1) the attorney's
testimony related to matters concerning his professional duties, and (2)
the attorney's testimony supported the position taken by his firm in their
representation of the client,2 ' and (3) the attorney testifying had such a
"long and intimate familiarity with the details of the matter in litiga-
tion,"2 that the client would be deprived unless he had the benefit of the
lawyer's testimony and the benefit of representation by his firm, and (4)
full disclosure had been made to opposing counsel and to the court. 23
Mr. Drinker 24 wrote the majority opinion and in the following quote
answers the argument against his position:
The possibility of the witness moulding his testimony in order
to secure a higher fee for his firm is more than balanced by the
injustice to the client of depriving the latter either of a necessary
witness or of a specially qualified lawyer. The possible interest
of the witness would merely affect his credibility. While it is
true that such a situation might require the lawyer for the estate
to argue the veracity of his partner, this would be equally the
case where the witness was his friend or his near relation. Actu-
ally, if the partner of the witness withdrew from the case and
asked one of his colleagues at the bar to take his place, the latter
would be not less assiduous in standing up for the witness'
reputation as would the latter's partner.
We do not construe the words "other counsel" in Canon 19
as necessarily excluding a partner of the lawyer who must be-
come a witness.25
Mr. Houghton, dissenting, argued that the partnership is an entity and
"that the same reasons that bar one member of a firm from acting as a
witness and counsel in the same case apply to all the partners as well." 6
Mr. Houghton also believed, despite the majority's opinion that the client
might be deprived unless he had the benefit of the lawyer's testimony
and the benefit of representation by his firm, that the client would not
"suffer any hardship in most cases, because he is required to obtain a new
advocate."27
In their Weikerer brief the appellees called Opinion No. 220 to the
21. Otherwise trial counsel would be placed in the awkward position of disparaging the
credibility of his partner.
22. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES 440
(1957 ed.).
23. For a discussion of Opinion 220 see DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 158 (1953).
24. Mr. Drinker is the author of LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 23.
25. ABA, OPINIONs OF THE Cos-TrrTrEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRiEVANCES 440-
441 (1957 ed.).
26. Id. at 443-444.
27. Id. at 444.
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supreme court's attention.2" The opinions of the A.B.A. Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances are of persuasive value only, having
no statutory effect.2" Justice O'Brien does not mention Opinion No. 220
in his opinion.
Various reasons have been assigned for the existence of Canon 19.0
One reason commonly given is that Canon 19 protects the image of the
profession by preventing embarrassing public criticism which might be
generated by the attorney-witness's obvious interest in the outcome of
the case. As stated in Opinion No. 50 (in the majority opinion by Mr.
Howe):
Although his zeal as a lawyer might not influence his testimony
as a witness, an ever critical public is only too apt to place such
a construction upon it. A lawyer should avoid not only all
improper relationships but should likewise, in order to maintain
the profession in public confidence and esteem, avoid all rela-
tionships which may appear to be improper."
Another suggested reason is that Canon 19 serves to prevent prejudice
to one party that may occur when trial counsel for the other party testifies
as a material witness. When trial counsel testifies as a material witness
the jury may have difficulty separating what the counsel "said as an
advocate from what he said as a witness."32 Failure to make this separation
could result in prejudice to the other party. Another reason is that Canon
19 avoids "putting a lawyer in the obviously embarassing predicament
of testifying and then having to argue the credibility and effect of his
own testimony." 8
As early as 1848 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania indicated its
disapproval of trial counsel appearing as a witness in a case. 4 The
supreme court has consistently condemned such a dual role for an
attorney.3 5 There is little dispute about the soundness of this position.
However, it does not necessarily follow that an attorney should be barred
from acting as trial counsel when his partner will appear as a material
witness in the case. In such an instance (1) the jury would have no
28. Brief for Appellees, p. 35.
29. Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEXAs L. Rv. 575 (1961), at
591, n.9.
30. For a discussion of some of them see Note, The Ethical Propriety of an Attorney's
Testifying in Behalf of his Own Client, 38 IowA L. REv. 139 (1952).
31. ABA, OPINioNs OF THE COaM31TEaE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES 139
(1957 ed.), Opinion 50 (1931).
32. Kausgaard v. Endres, 126 Neb. 129, 132, 252 N.W. 810, 812 (1934).
33. Galarowicz v. Ward, 119 Utah 611, -, 230 P.2d 576, 580 (1951).
34. Frear v. Drinker, 8 Pa. 520, 521 (1848).
35. Com. v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 235-236, 202 A.2d 521, 530, petition den. 415 Pa.
218, 203 A.2d 319 (1964) ; Otto Will, 349 Pa. 205, 211, 36 A.2d 797, 799 (1944).
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difficulty separating testimony from advocacy, and (2) trial counsel
would not be placed in the awkward position of arguing his own credi-
bility. Thus, two of the reasons for refusing to permit an attorney-witness
to act as trial counsel do not apply to the situation where trial counsel is
a partner of the attorney-witness. There still remains the argument ,that
the partner-witness has an interest in the outcome of the case and thus
might be tempted or pressured to mold his testimony into a form most
favorable to the client of his firm. However, this interest argument can be
made of many witnesses, yet their testimony is permitted, subject to
attack as to credibility. It is submitted that the argument of interest,
standing alone, should not justify the exclusion of an attorney as trial
counsel in a case wherein his partner will appear as a material witness. It
is doubtful that the image of the profession will be damaged in such cases.
The present Canons of Ethics have undergone considerable criticism
in recent years and a special committee has been created by the American
Bar Association to re-evaluate and possibly revise the Canons. 6 At this
time it cannot be determined whether the special committee has decided to
alter Canon 19 or to reconsider the position taken in Opinion No. 220. It
is submitted that the present position is the correct one. However, in
view of the Wiekerer dicta, the committee should consider the problem
again and restate Canon 19 in accordance with its decision.
John Ralph Kenrick
TRIAL PRACTICE-Judge and Jury-Absence of Counsel-In a recent
series of decisions the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that any
communication by the judge with the jury other than in open court and
in the presence of counsel for all parties requires reversal notwithstand-
ing the absence of prejudice.
Gould v. Argiro, 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654 (1966). Kersey Mfg. Co. v.
Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 222 A.2d 713 (1966). Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa.
364, 223 A.2d 696 (1966).
During its deliberations in Gould v. Argiro,' the jury sent two requests for
further instructions to the trial judge who informed them by return note
to only utilize the testimony given by the witnesses in the case. Neither
36. Powell, The President's Page, 50 A.B.A.J. 1005 (1964). For a general discussion of
the problems which may be considered by the special committee see Swindler, Toward a
Restatement of Professional Ethics, 27 U. PITT. L. Rav. 795 (1966), and Cheatham, Sutton,
Sears, Armstrong, Watson, Johnstone, Elson, Thode, and Weckstein, Re-evaluation of the
Canons of Professional Ethics: A Symposium, 33 TENN. L. RFv. 129 (1966).
1. Gould v. Argiro, 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654 (1966). Argued on May 25, 1966; decided
on June 24, 1966.
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